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 1. Introduction. 
 
The pace of the Doha negotiations and the events that took place in the past two 
years in the external front of Mercosul announce that the second half of this 
century’s first decade will witness a revival of regional initiatives. The WTO 
Round  will  probably  deliver  a  package  of  resolutions  that,  though  always 
important, are more likely to set key targets for future liberalisations, beyond 
modest advances in the main trade areas. This will inevitably trigger a new push 
for regional agreements to complement, or answer, quests that were on the table 
in Geneva. For the Southern Cone, it is nearly a certainty that both negotiations 
that have been put aside, the free trade areas (FTAs) with, respectively, the EU25 
and the whole Western Hemisphere, will resume. The latter has already suffered 
many changes, and may even take place in a direct agreement with the US. 
But  not  only  former  discussions  will  re-emerge.  There  is  at  present 
significant activity in South America – tied with recent and challenging political 
developments – leading, through more than one route, to a closer integration of 
the Southern sub-continent. At the same time, the US, while keeping its face in 
the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), has signed several agreements 
with Central and South American groups of countries that, in a way or other, will 
change the direction of many trade flows. In fact, in the case of South American 
countries, there is a sort of subdued competition between it and Mercosul, to see 
which side will attract more partners, and gain first the commercial chunks lying 
in  third  groups  like  the  Andean  Community  (AC).  Additional  complexity  is 
provided by the increasing role of China, and the Asian continent in general, in 
the world trade flows, affecting not only the major Northern blocs – EU25 and 
NAFTA – but Mercosul as well, especially Brazil and Argentina.   
All this calls for a re-evaluation of exercises performed some time ago, 
together with the introduction of new scenarios. In this paper, we use a brand 
new static CGE model, AMIDA – Analysing Mercosul’s Integration Decisions 
and  Agreements,  to  help  in  shedding  light  on  this  diversity  of  options  and 
opportunities.  The  AMIDA  –  Analysing  Mercosur’s  Integration  Decisions  and 
Agreements model
1, in its present, first version, though containing two service 
sectors for closing the structure of the economy, is more suitable for the analysis 
of market access for goods. Refinements and improvements, as a better, modern 
treatment of services, are planned, in order to encompass other important issues, 
part of most agreements at stake. Though it uses perhaps the best available data 
set on Mercosul’s world trade flows and barriers – a most crucial point for these 
exercises –, continuous updating and use of more accurate information is also in 
view. 
  The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 contains a few lines 
on methodological aspects related to the model, discussing also data sources and 
decisions.  Section  3  presents  the  sectoral  aggregation,  the  regions  and  the 
scenarios. Six FTAs have been the object of this study. Results are presented and 
commented upon in section 4, while section 5 tries to use them to make a first 
assessment of Mercosul’s potentialities and shortcomings. Section 6 concludes. 
Conclusions deal  with more technical aspects as well  as those describing the 
main policy guidelines that can be extracted from the work. 
 
   
2. Brief description of the model and data. 
 
2.1. Basic facts. 
The  model  basic  lines  follow  those  in  Flôres  (1997,  2003),  being  a  static, 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model in which strategic interaction takes 
place in certain sectors. This means that, contrary to the common practice of 
introducing  ad  hoc  “scale  gains”  in  an  otherwise  perfect  competition  CGE
2, 
perfect and (explicitly) imperfect competition sectors interact in the model. This 
approach was fashioned in Gasiorek, Smith and Venables (1992) – drawing on a 
                                                            
1 AMIDA, infinite light, is also a great Buddha who, in our bodies, occupies the mouth. The 
authors hope the model to be a voice that will help Mercosur in choosing the best agreements.  
2 For a discussion of this topic, and of the (usually) accompanying “dynamic elasticities” device, 
see, among others, Flôres (2000).  pioneer partial equilibrium structure by Smith and Venables (1988) -, who used it 
to evaluate the impacts of the Europe 92 Delors’s initiative.  
In  general,  due  to  the  scale  effects  –  enhanced  in  the  larger  markets 
created  by  the  regional  integrations  -,  welfare  gains  are  higher  than  those 
produced  by  the  perfect  competition  alternatives
3.  However,  in  all  FTAs 
examined here, like the FTAA  or the  EU25-Mercosul cases, country  markets 
remain segmented as what is at stake is the creation of free-trade areas and not a 
common  market.  This  means  that  the  model  solutions,  for  the  imperfect 
competition  sectors,  keep  the  segmented  markets  approach.  The  results,  as 
discussed in section 4, seem promising and point to patterns and effects unable to 
be unveiled by other techniques.  
Another important issue is that, beyond tariffs, Flôres (1997, 2003) and 
Gasiorek, Smith and Venables (1992) assumed the existence of additional trade 
costs which can be associated to a variety of factors, impairing or raising the cost 
of  trade  between  two  countries,  like  transportation,  bureaucracy,  distribution 
costs,  etc.  Integration  zeroes  the  tariffs  and  reduces,  without  necessarily 
eliminating, these latter costs. We estimated gross transport margins with the aid 
of  COMTRADE,  minimising  discrepancies  with  official  statistics.  In  most 
bilateral flows they amount to less than 10 per cent, though there are significant 
differences  at  the  sectoral  level,  due  to  inconsistencies  and  misreporting.  We 
reduced them between the partners, in each scenario, by 4 percentage points, at 
most, as trade facilitation. No evaluation was made of other trade costs. This 
does  not  mean  that  such  improvement  is  not  worth  pursuing  in  further 
simulations. 
From  the  theoretical  side,  handling  the  two  kinds  of  competition  in  a 
single general equilibrium framework poses theoretical problems related to the 
existence and uniqueness of solutions, fully discussed, for instance, in Chapter 11 
of Ginsburgh and Keyzer (1997). In our particular case, the specifications used 
                                                            
3 See, for instance, Baldwin and Venables (1995) and Flôres (1996).  
 guarantee  the  existence  of  a  unique  solution,  and  we  shall  not  mention  this 
question hereafter.  
Flôres and Watanuki (2005) provide a detailed description of the model 
equations, carefully discussing their role and pros and cons. Calibration and data 
issues are also addressed in detail. We shall, in the remaining of this section, 
briefly outline some key points. 
Firms in imperfect competition sectors are symmetric and play a Cournot-
Nash  strategy  in  each  market/region,  a  key  parameter  being  the  perceived 
elasticity of demand in region i, for product j, manufactured in region i’, e(i’,i; j), 
which is defined as: 
 
1/e(i’,i; j)  = 1/s(i;j)  + ( 1 - 1/s(i;j) ) s(i’,i; j) 
 
where s(i;j) is the elasticity of substitution, in region i, between goods j from 
different origins and s(i’,i; j) is region’s i’ market share for product j, in region i. 
Introducing imperfect competition in the way  done here allows for the 
computation of both short and long run solutions. In the former, the number of 
(identical) firms in each imperfect competition sector is kept constant, so that 
profits  can  be  different  from  zero  in  these  sectors.  In  the  latter,  profits  are 
imposed to be zero, and the number of firms is adjusted to satisfy this condition. 
The structure of the model allows it to portray distinct levels of regional 
integration in a progressive scenario evaluation. It contains  both standard and 
innovative features, as the ones below
4: 
i)  in  the  demand  side  there  is  a  representative  consumer  with  a  Dixit-
Stiglitz-Spence CES utility function in an Armington-like tree structure; 
ii)  in  the  production  side,  perfect  competition  sectors  have  Cobb-Douglas 
technologies;  
iii)  intermediate inputs are treated via a shortcut using the input-output (I-O) 
coefficients; 
                                                            
4 See, as mentioned before, Flôres and Watanuki (2005) for complete details. iv)  wages are flexible, as labour is assumed mobile among sectors, but the 
(sector specific) capital remuneration rates are kept constant;   
v)  there is no money in the model; 
vi)  in  equilibrium,  different  closures  (“equilibrium”  and  “disequilibrium” 
ones) can be applied; 
vii)  calibration  is,  in  these  models,  much  more  delicate.  A  new  strategy, 
accommodating polynomial cost structures depicting the scale economies 
effect in the imperfect competition sectors, added more flexibility to this 
key operation. 
Finally,  the  whole  model  is  run  in  an  easy,  GAMS-like  programming 
language 
  
2.2.  The data set. 
An outstanding Western Hemisphere Database, combining information from the 
UN, Eurostat, OECD, TRAINS, US Trade Representative, CEPAL, the World 
Bank, national statistical institutes and central banks, GTAP’s latest database and 
the IDB was produced. 
In order to have a minimum compatibility among the different sources, the 
base  year  for  all  data  refers  to  2001,  which  was  adapted  to  the  regions  and 
particular features of the model. We consider this a fairly ideal decision, as 2002 
and 2003 were not very representative years for Brazil and, especially, Argentina, 
and much information for 2004 was still unavailable.  
Production and demand structures received careful attention in the case of 
Mercosul. A key element relates to the I-O matrices for Brazil and Argentina, 
which  feature  in  rather  old  versions  in  GTAP.  The  1996  and  2000  versions, 
respectively,  were  updated  and  inserted  instead.  Also,  Armington  elasticities 
came from special sources for these two countries. Capital remuneration rates 
were improved whenever possible. 
The US, Mexican, AC, Japanese, Chinese and EU economic data were 
reasonably checked. Information on the complete protection structure is always debatable, even 
if one sticks to the case of tariffs. Preferential tariffs – specially those originating 
from trade agreements –, usually poorly depicted, had to be thoroughly reviewed 
in cases like Mercosul. Given the importance of the other two key regions in the 
model,  the  US  and  the  EU,  improvements  on  their  protection  structure  were 
made with the aid of data from the United States International Trade Commission 
– USITC website and EUROSTAT and Messerlin (2001), respectively.  
Data from INTAL/ALADI and recent studies conducted by IPEA in Brazil 
were also useful complementary sources. At the level of detail of the present 
study, many nuances and, sometimes, important tariff peaks either disappear or 
are  smoothed  out  when  aggregated  to  produce  a  single  figure  for  the  sector. 
Nevertheless,  the  fact  that  the  protection  structure  was  computed  bottom-up, 
easily  allows  to  translate  any  detailed  (8-digits)  concession/restriction  to  the 
aggregation level of the model. 
 
 
3.  Sectors, Regions and Scenarios. 
 
3.1. Sectors and regions. 
We aimed at an as comprehensive as possible world regionalisation and sectoral 
disaggregation.  The  economies  were  decomposed  into  twenty-five  sectors 
distributed along six groups, namely
5: 
  
I. (Classical) Agriculture: 
Wheat, corn and other grains (Grains) 
Vegetables & fruits 
Oil seeds & soybeans 
Sugar 
Coffee, rice & other crops (Coffee, rice & others) 
Animal products  
                                                            
5 For the sectors, names between brackets are as they appear in the tables, in sections 4 and 5. II. Agribusiness (ab):  
  Bovine meat # 
  Poultry meat # 
Dairy products 
Beverages & tobaccos (Bev. & tobacco) # 
Vegetable oils  
III. Energy: 
  Minerals 
  Energy products 
IV. Light Manufactures: 
Textiles & apparel (Text. & apparel) 
Leather, wood & paper (Leather, wood, paper) 
Other light manufactures (Other light manufac.)  
V. Heavy Manufactures: 
Chemical and plastic products (Chemicals & plastics)   
Ferrous metals 
Non-ferrous metals 
Motor vehicles  # 
Other transport equipment (Other transp. equip.)  # 
Electric equipment   
Machinery   
VI. Services: 
Utilities & construction 
 Trade and services. 
  
The first five groups comprise the 23 trade-in-goods sectors which will be 
the main focus of our analyses. Five out of them – those marked with an ‘#’ 
above – were modelled under imperfect competition. These structures are better 
portrayed in the model regions related to the Mercosul countries, the US, Japan 
and the EU25 (see below). Decisions on the regions must face one of the most classical dilemmas in 
CGE practice: due attention to the areas of concern (and those which affect them) 
together with care in not fragmenting too much the model, what, among other 
practical problems, may add distortions to its construction and operation. Given 
the interest in analysing several different scenarios from a Mercosul perspective, 
we divided the world into the following ten regions: 




2. the United States 
3.  the  Andean  Community  (Bolivia,  Colombia,  Ecuador,  Peru  and 
Venezuela) 
4.  the  Rest  of  the  Americas  (or  Western  Hemisphere)  –  RoWH 
(comprising the remaining 23 potential FTAA countries) 
  5. the EU25 countries 
  6. Japan 
  7. China 
  8. the Asian 10 emerging economies (Asia10) 
  9. the Rest of the World - RoW. 
   
As regards the quality of the data adaptation to these regions, the best ones  
seem to be, as mentioned, those for Mercosul, Mexico, the AC, the US, the EU25 
and Japan. The Rest of the Western Hemisphere is naturally a simplification, 
though it includes, beyond the whole Central America, countries like Canada and 
Chile.  Equilibrium  flows  to  the  Rest  of  the  World  may  also  be  obtained  by 
difference and econometric techniques. In this last region, are found countries 
that may be relevant for certain sectors, like Australia and New Zealand, or India. 
All  the  (former)  New  Tigers  –  Hong  Kong,  Korea,  Singapore  and  Taiwan  -, 
beyond  six  new  emerging  Asian  economies,  like  Indonesia,  Malaysia  or 
                                                            
6  From this region, individual country results, if desired, can be extracted (see Flôres and 
Watanuki (2005), section 2.7). We shall not pursue this in the present paper. 
 Vietnam, which are becoming competitive either in specific agricultural goods or 
in traditional sectors like textiles, are in Asia10.  
Exhibit  I  shows,  for  Mercosul,  the  values  of  the  trade  flows,  for  the 
twenty-three merchandise sectors, plus the services group. It is an essential tool 
for understanding the scope of the model and the true meaning of the results 
discussed in the next section.  
 
 
Exhibit I: Mercosul: Trade flows – imports and exports, 2001 -, by regions (10
6 
US$). 
I.A: Exports (fob) [cont.] 
REGIONS  SECTORS 
1  2  3  4  5 
Grains  19,0  3,0  191,6  155,5  301,4 
Vegetables & fruits  210,7  2,7  18,2  54,7  797,0 
Oilseeds & soybeans  26,1  44,4  116,4  52,6  2.312,9 
Sugar  105,6    6,0  107,7  24,4 
Coffee, rice & others  464,6  37,6  47,0  112,9  1.441,3 
Animal products  838,0  53,0  207,5  271,7  1.976,7 
Bovine meat (ab)   39,5  2,6  14,7  215,7  547,8 
Poultry meat (ab)  186,7    5,3  18,9  828,8 
Dairy products (ab)  33,9  94,7  55,0  29,9  0,5 
Bev. & tobacco (ab)  62,0  9,8  15,6  36,9  91,2 
Vegetable oils (ab)  39,0  1,3  256,6  221,6  3.653,7 
Minerals  556,7  72,9  87,4  228,2  1.857,8 
Energy products  639,1  1,4  61,0  2.104,2  226,9 
Text. & apparel  357,0  49,8  158,8  152,6  329,2 
Leather, wood, paper  3.306,2  188,2  215,3  512,3  2.438,9 
Other light manufac.  115,9  11,4  27,1  24,7  48,8 
Chemicals & plastics  1.033,9  204,6  745,4  732,6  954,0 
Ferrous metals  1.382,3  154,9  303,6  275,8  695,5 
Non-ferrous metals  861,4  70,7  134,5  206,7  837,7 Motor vehicles  1.356,0  1.142,6  593,8  445,0  931,1 
Other transp. equip.  2.430,4  9,7  25,1  44,1  707,2 
Electric equipment  1.417,6  104,7  131,3  136,9  213,9 
Machinery  1.387,2  283,2  578,3  519,3  793,2 
(Services)  2.166,4  139,5  85,5  515,4  5.839,4 
TOTAL  19.035,4  2.682,9  4.081,0  7.175,7  27.849,2 
 
I.A: Exports (fob) [end] 
REGIONS  SECTORS 
6  7  8  9 
TOTAL 
Grains  134,6  2,5  207,1  1.112,2  2.127,0 
Vegetables & fruits  1,4    10,2  88,7  1.183,6 
Oilseeds & soybeans  171,3  1.496,7  286,5  308,6  4.815,4 
Sugar  0,2  25,1  106,1  1.639,2  2.014,3 
Coffee, rice & others  194,0  88,3  84,4  423,1  2.893,1 
Animal products  299,2  56,3  179,6  526,6  4.408,7 
Bovine meat (ab)   7,4  1,0  103,1  324,1  1.255,9 
Poultry meat (ab)  177,8  6,2  206,5  731,1  2.161,2 
Dairy products (ab)  1,9    4,4  40,2  260,6 
Bev. & tobacco (ab)  43,9  0,4  9,6  28,6  298,0 
Vegetable oils (ab)  31,1  21,5  638,9  2.285,3  7.149,0 
Minerals  716,9  668,4  336,0  668,2  5.192,4 
Energy products    27,3    168,8  3.228,6 
Text. & apparel  40,6  126,2  17,8  66,2  1.298,2 
Leather, wood, paper  240,3  387,0  580,2  371,1  8.239,6 
Other light manufac.  16,6  1,4  7,8  20,7  274,4 
Chemicals & plastics  107,4  78,4  159,3  357,4  4.373,2 
Ferrous metals  113,2  116,3  429,8  385,5  3.857,1 
Non-ferrous metals  385,3  24,3  52,5  379,7  2.952,8 
Motor vehicles  9,3  130,0  31,7  332,4  4.972,0 
Other transp. equip.  0,8  60,9  18,9  256,1  3.553,2 
Electric equipment  19,1  25,6  40,2  36,0  2.125,2 Machinery  36,6  101,9  94,6  354,6  4.148,9 
(Services)  837,2  205,6  1.552,5  2.159,8  13.501,3 
TOTAL  3.586,0  3.651,3  5.157,9  13.064,5  86.283,8 
 
I.B: Imports (cif) [cont.] 
REGIONS  SECTORS 
1  2  3  4  5 
Grains  17,6    0,1  15,0  0,2 
Vegetables & fruits  9,7  3,3  79,1  114,5  32,5 
Oilseeds & soybeans  1,8  0,7  0,1  2,0  1,1 
Sugar           
Coffee, rice & others  38,4  0,7  13,3  13,6  48,7 
Animal products  224,2  29,5  110,9  180,1  310,5 
Bovine meat (ab)   4,9      2,3  3,7 
Poultry meat (ab)  3,5    0,6  8,2  21,0 
Dairy products (ab)  11,0  0,2    4,2  41,1 
Bev. & tobacco (ab)  26,4  5,0  1,2  60,5  272,3 
Vegetable oils (ab)  8,6  0,1  2,4  0,2  81,9 
Minerals  166,9  21,1  105,3  298,6  381,5 
Energy products  337,8    773,5  100,3  79,4 
Text. & apparel  163,7  32,5  31,3  60,5  357,7 
Leather, wood, paper  446,7  14,6  40,9  464,3  894,7 
Other light manufac.  109,8  4,9  6,8  15,5  177,8 
Chemicals & plastics  4.950,9  470,2  252,1  485,1  5.389,5 
Ferrous metals  105,3  13,4  5,9  20,2  438,1 
Non-ferrous metals  545,4  16,2  172,3  423,3  964,1 
Motor vehicles  537,4  232,8  9,8  69,6  2.516,1 
Other transp. equip.  2.075,4  0,7    92,1  951,9 
Electric equipment  3.633,5  200,3  0,7  254,0  1.784,6 
Machinery  5.211,3  147,8  58,3  292,8  7.367,9 
(Services)  4.129,2  209,0  98,8  1.002,9  9.650,2 
TOTAL  22.759,3  1.403,1  1.763,2  3.979,9  31.766,5 
 I.B: Imports (cif) [end] 
REGIONS  SECTORS 
6  7  8  9 
TOTAL 
Grains        0,7  33,4 
Vegetables & fruits    10,5  3,3  28,2  281,2 
Oilseeds & soybeans    0,1    1,1  6,9 
Sugar           
Coffee, rice & others  4,5  4,6  27,7  68,6  219,9 
Animal products  5,8  21,4  53,2  257,3  1.192,9 
Bovine meat (ab)       0,3  2,8  14,0 
Poultry meat (ab)  0,2      0,4  33,8 
Dairy products (ab)        21,0  77,5 
Bev. & tobacco (ab)  0,4  0,1  0,8  42,7  409,3 
Vegetable oils (ab)  0,1    33,4  11,8  138,4 
Minerals  47,8  54,8  38,6  143,0  1.257,5 
Energy products  42,6  185,6  27,4  2.399,6  3.946,1 
Text. & apparel  18,4  302,7  597,2  368,0  1.932,0 
Leather, wood, paper  23,6  177,0  149,3  117,4  2.328,5 
Other light manufac.  33,6  295,7  100,5  37,2  781,9 
Chemicals & plastics  532,5  550,4  805,6  2.582,7  16.018,9 
Ferrous metals  68,6  23,0  59,4  186,5  920,4 
Non-ferrous metals  143,8  117,0  111,5  263,0  2.756,6 
Motor vehicles  847,5  8,2  301,7  307,7  4.830,8 
Other transp. equip.  135,3  87,5  70,2  90,5  3.503,7 
Electric equipment  807,1  644,8  2.110,5  735,9  10.171,5 
Machinery  1.496,2  830,6  1.053,0  1.156,7  17.614,5 
(Services)  699,7  297,4  2.614,2  2.948,1  21.649,5 
TOTAL  4.907,6  3.611,4  8.157,8  11.770,8  90.119,6 
   
 
3.2.  The scenarios. 
We tried to run a diversified set of scenarios to produce a global idea on the 
different  options  nowadays  on  the  table  for  Mercosul.  The  main  ones  are, naturally,  the  FTAs  with,  respectively,  the  US  and  the  EU.  Both  can  be 
contrasted to the FTAA initiative – in its original form – as well as to a set of 
alternatives, comprising different international positions Mercosul may assume. 
Moreover,  they  should  also  be  confronted  with  possible  outcomes  from  the 
present WTO Doha Round, what hasn’t been done in this paper
7.  
Five scenarios, which will be called basic, have then been defined. These 
basic  options  may  be  translated  into  manifold  ways  as  well  as  combined  in 
multiple forms. A sixth scenario, involving a FTA with China is also considered. 
Out  of  the  wide  spectrum  of  possible  combinations,  the  following  will  be 
discussed here: 
 
Scenario  A.  The  first  main  scenario,  in  which  Mercosul  closes  a  full  FTA 
agreement with the US. 
Scenario  B.  The  second  main  one,  with  the  EU25-Mercosul  FTA  fully 
implemented.  
Scenario  C.  This  is  a  first  “diversion”,  with  Mercosul  signing  a  FTA  with 
Mexico. 
Scenario D. A second diversion, Mercosul now closing a FTA with the Andean 
Community, something that is already a reality on paper. 
Scenario E. The classical implementation of the FTAA, meaning that all tariffs, 
for all sectors, among all the regions comprising the American continent in the 
model are zeroed.  
Scenario F. This scenario includes a different option, analysing the impact of 
Mercosul’s free trade with China. 
   
Of  course,  it  is  also  desirable  to  evaluate  the  impact  of  not-so-perfect 
FTA’s, something that will be pursued later, following lines in Flôres (2003). At 
present, supposing full FTAs are implemented in all cases allows a clearer cross 
evaluation of them.   
                                                            
7    The  main  reason  for  this  absence  is  that,  even  after  the  December  2005  Hong  Kong 
Ministerial, the format of the final agreement remains quite open.   
 
4.  Results. 
 
Tables 1 to 14 are a selection of the most interesting results, they concentrate 
initially on the impacts in the trade flows. All deserve careful analysis and will be 
briefly discussed below. It is worth reminding – specially given  the previous 
remarks on the database and the aggregate level of the study – that all the figures 
should be basically evaluated in relation to each other, within and between tables, 
and  not  taken  separately,  as  a  precise  single  value  for  the  changes.  The 
importance of this section is to identify areas or situations – or rather sectors and 
scenarios – where things can go better or worse. Detailed quantification of profits 
or losses should be made at a greater level of detail, ultimately with the aid of 
partial equilibrium models
8. 
  Table 1 describes the changes in trade flows under the two main scenarios. 
Four out of the five highest increases for exports, in the EU25 scenario (B), are in 
commodities (2) and agribusiness (2) sectors, the other being textiles & apparel. 
In  the  US  case,  two  heavy  manufactures  sectors  appear,  beyond  one  in  the 
agribusiness – thanks largely to orange juice - and two traditional ones, textiles 
(again) included.  
In a rough overall picture, the EU25 FTA seems to favour demand for 
more traditional Mercosul’s exports, while the US one promotes some higher 
value-added  exports.  The  very  protectionist  European  CAP  -  Common 
Agricultural Policy shows itself indirectly in the significant increases in bovine 
and  poultry  meat;  US  figures  in  the  agribusiness  sectors  being  more  modest. 
However, the EU25 remains competitive in this area and, either due to this, or to 
compensate the demand surge in the EU, or both, Mercosul’s imports changes of 
agricultural commodities and agribusiness are, but for two exceptions (grains and 
bovine meat), considerably higher in the EU25 FTA. Indeed, this is also valid for 
                                                            
8 Given all the methodological caveats already mentioned, we decided not to translate the results 
into monetary values, something that could easily be misleading.  most of the remaining sectors, only exceptions being other transport equipment 
and electric equipment.  
At  the  bottom  of  the  Table,  the  value  of  the  correlation  coefficients 
between each two corresponding vectors is displayed (not including services). 
Given  the  very  high  increase  in  bovine  meat  exports  in  Scenario  B,  the 
coefficients, for exports, were computed with and without this sector. There is no 
(linear) relation between the two exports patterns, while the imports ones show a 
certain degree of common behaviour.  
Nearly all these contrasting results may be partially explained by the more 
open, in relative terms, US protectionist structure. 
 
 
Table 1: Mercosul’s FTAs with the US and the EU25: Total trade flows changes 
(long run results; exports and imports) under scenarios A and B. 
Scenario A  Scenario B  Sectors 
Exports  Imports  Exports  Imports 
Grains  1.09  66.74  11.86  59.48 
Vegetables & fruits  3.70  5.69  28.67  46.25 
Oil seeds & soybeans  0.39  34.03  -5.26  62.06 
Sugar  6.01  -  7.59  - 
Coffee, rice & others  7.95  35.52  41.61  135.55 
Animal products  7.81  33.57  40.98  123.91 
Bovine meat (ab)   3.76  34.42  269.02  25.99 
Poultry meat (ab)  4.36  6.70  81.55  60.92 
Dairy products (ab)  13.02  32.65  0.33  114.67 
Bev. & tobacco (ab)  25.71  10.67  10.23  118.95 
Vegetable oils (ab)  0.70  13.62  24.32  198.44 
Minerals  5.89  12.87  14.03  33.53 
Energy products  2.04  0.80  -0.08  5.72 
Text. & apparel  25.09  14.44  42.36  31.80 Leather, wood, paper  20.87  12.00  23.30  23.88 
Other light manufac.  6.21  42.02  9.34  62.56 
Chemicals & plastics  15.08  7.89  12.37  8.44 
Ferrous metals  13.52  7.63  15.75  26.12 
Non-ferrous metals  12.83  9.38  24.88  15.86 
Motor vehicles  19.11  22.27  9.95  100.34 
Other transp. equip.  26.05  41.32  4.42  25.21 
Electric equipment  20.73  5.61  8.91  3.71 
Machinery  16.35  11.61  18.26  15.76 
(Services)  0.97  -1.10  -2.67  3.29 
TOTAL  9.51  9.09  19.42  18.57 
Correlation between the two patterns: i) Exports,  -0.08 (without bovine meat),  -0.21 
(with bovine meat); ii) Imports, 0.27 . 
 
 
  Tables 2 and 3 deepen the insight, showing the regional distribution of the 
increases,  according  to  the  five  groups  of  sectors
9.  Both  regional  agreements 
present limited territorial externalities, with however certain nuances. The US 
one  seems  to  cause  some  efficiency  gains  in  light  and  heavy  manufactures 
sectors, where Mercosul is able to increase exports to other areas in the world. In 
the latter group, sensible increases take place in the three Asiatic regions, the 
EU25 and the RoW. Nevertheless, the imports pattern is largely dominated by 
very  high  penetration  of  the  US  flows,  with,  but  for  agricultural  sectors, 
decreases in the demand elsewhere. Though these are usually negligible, for the 
two manufactures groups figures become again more significant, particularly for 
heavy manufactures, exactly in the same five regions already mentioned. Very 
clearly, the agreement will provoke trade deviation, in these sectors, from Asia 
and the EU25 to US suppliers. A similar pattern, reasonably significant, also 
takes place with the energy group. 
                                                            
9 They can be complemented by tables showing the same information at the sector level. These, 
and many other, more detailed tables, can be obtained from the authors.   Increases in exports to the partner are usually more modest in scenario A 
than  in  B.  This  very  often  also  corresponds  to  lower  absolute  values. 
Manufacturing groups IV and V sell, to the US, under scenario A, extra values of 
1.98 bn US$ and 3.30 bn US$, respectively, while the much higher European 
percentages  under  scenario  B  amount  to  2.83  bn  US$  and  3.55  bn  US$, 
respectively: a sizeable difference in the first case.    
 
 
Table 2: Mercosul’s FTA with the US (Scenario A): Trade flows changes (long 
run results) by Regions and Groups of Sectors. 
2A. Exports. 
Sector Groups  Regions 
I  II  III  IV  V 
US  56.92  60.67  21.24  52.44  33.39 
Mexico  -1.67  0.50  0.62  0.57  7.16 
Andean  -0.26  0.48  1.00  1.04  5.27 
RoWH  -0.51  0.85  0.42  0.75  6.35 
EU25  -1.64  0.71  2.18  1.32  8.96 
Japan  -1.57  1.46  2.36  1.89  8.96 
China   -0.93  1.01  2.46  2.39  10.77 
Asia10  -0.57  0.88  2.33  1.00  7.81 
RoW  -0.30  0.79  2.27  1.89  9.20 
 
2B. Imports. 
Sector Groups  Regions 
I  II  III  IV  V 
US  175.50  192.49  54.44  141.28  64.45 
Mexico  -0.56  -1.73  -2.74  -3.17  -9.06 
Andean  0.39  -1.34  -1.58  -2.28  -7.55 
RoWH  0.01  -1.76  -2.39  -0.95  -9.37 EU25  0.31  -1.59  -2.43  -2.23  -12.01 
Japan  2.94  -1.69  -1.41  -5.21  -12.09 
China   0.67  -1.30  -1.73  -5.06  -10.94 
Asia10  2.02  -1.12  -1.54  -3.59  -9.26 
RoW  0.90  -1.57  -1.52  -3.16  -9.20 
Key to the groups [(number of sectors)]: I – agriculture (6), II – agribusiness (5), III – 
energy (2), IV – light manufactures (3), V – heavy manufactures (7). 
 
 
Table 3: Mercosul’s FTA with the EU25 (Scenario B): Trade flows changes 
(long run results) by Regions and Groups of Sectors. 
3A. Exports. 
Sector Groups  Regions 
I  II  III  IV  V 
US  -17.08  -6.49  -3.51  -4.05  -2.09 
Mexico  -18.51  -2.75  -3.15  -2.84  -2.39 
Andean  -21.89  -8.28  -5.45  -0.96  1.02 
RoWH  -17.26  -5.71  -2.15  -3.05  1.52 
EU25  79.72  144.99  54.04  100.41  69.21 
Japan  -26.65  -5.72  -11.30  -7.99  3.36 
China   -17.32  -16.08  -11.35  -8.14  3.75 
Asia10  -21.28  -11.20  -11.89  -7.79  3.46 
RoW  -17.19  -8.89  -11.71  -7.68  2.40 
 
3B. Imports. 
Sector Groups  Regions 
I  II  III  IV  V 
US  57.04  10.19  5.02  0.28  -9.82 
Mexico  51.61  8.11  4.38  -0.34  -7.38 
Andean  43.52  16.76  5.08  0.16  -6.89 
RoWH  44.76  6.66  4.52  1.51  -8.04 EU25  312.61  201.38  86.58  117.17  73.11 
Japan  66.33  9.35  2.18  -2.11  -10.72 
China   49.09  8.21  5.12  -2.04  -8.97 
Asia10  62.53  26.85  2.51  -0.78  -6.89 
RoW  58.03  10.22  5.49  -0.41  -7.73 
Key to the groups [(number of sectors)]: I – agriculture (6), II – agribusiness (5), III – 
energy (2), IV – light manufactures (3), V – heavy manufactures (7). 
 
 
It is interesting to notice that the EU25 FTA pattern is nearly opposite to 
the one depicted in Table 2. The considerable rise in exports to the EU takes 
place at the expense of generalised decreases in all other regions, for every sector 
but heavy manufactures in the Asian and RoW regions, plus the AC and the 
RoWH.  Imports,  however,  increase  almost  everywhere,  exceptions  being  the 
Asian regions and Mexico in light manufactures, and all destinations in heavy 
manufactures,  where  –  as  happened  in  the  US  FTA  -  there  is  a  clear  trade 
deviation in favour of the partner’s exports. 
The combination of all results till now suggests a few things. First, both 
FTAs with a Northern bloc will enhance Mercosul’s competitiveness in heavy 
manufactures, very likely at the cost of inducing a considerable (though needed) 
readjustment in this group of sectors. Second, while Scenario A transforms the 
US  into  the  major  Mercosul  supplier,  in  spite  of  probably  also  turning  the 
Southern  Cone  into  a  more  competitive  bloc,  Scenario  B  strongly  channels 
Mercosul exports to the EU, in such a way that it is impelled to demand more 
goods  from  all  other  regions.  Clearly,  this  signals  to  the  more  distorting  EU 
protection  structure,  but  also  warns  on  the  higher  US  dependency  the  sole 
completion of Scenario A may entail. 
The US Scenario A has two deviations and one deepening, the FTAA 
itself. Table 4 shows the changes in the flows, by sectors groups, for Scenarios C 
and D. The figures are more modest, though in the case of Mexico the increases 
in  manufactures  exports  (light  and  heavy)  are  somewhat  higher.  The  Andean Community,  on  the  other  hand,  shows  its  competitiveness  in  agriculture  and 
energy, where the highest changes in Mercosul’s imports take place.  
 
 
Table 4: Mercosul’s FTAs with Mexico and the Andean Community: Total trade 
flows changes (long run results; exports and imports) under scenarios C and D. 
Scenario C  Scenario D  Sectors Groups 
Exports  Imports  Exports  Imports 
Agriculture  0.36  5.02  2.72  16.02 
Agribusiness  1.72  3.07  1.73  3.14 
Energy  -0.04  1.31  0.96  4.64 
Light Manufactures  2.62  2.93  1.51  3.20 
Heavy Manufactures  6.69  2.82  4.45  1.61 
(Services)  -0.89  1.06  -1.13  1.37 
TOTAL  2.47  2.36  2.20  2.11 
 
 
Table 5 gives a better, more detailed view of the dynamics of these South-
South integrations by displaying, for the four key regions, the sectoral changes in 
the  Andean  Community  FTA.  The  agreement  causes  deviation  of  Mercosul 
exports  in  all  other  regions,  though  in  general  low;  the  highest  one  being, 
uniformly, in the grains sector
10. It dramatically  unlocks Mercosul  exports of 
sugar, animal and dairy products, but the increases are significant for all sectors: 
electric equipment, with 29.51 is the lowest one.  
Contrasting imports and exports, evidences of intra-industry trade between 
the two blocs emerge – at the aggregation level of the model –, in the areas of 
beverages & tobacco, machinery, textiles & apparel, other light manufactures and 
motor  vehicles,  among  others.  These  last  two  sectors  account  for  the  highest 
percentage increases in Andean exports to Mercosul. Indeed, they, together with 
poultry meat, appear as a bit of a surprise. Combining them with the figures for coffe, rice & other crops, animal products, vegetable oils and electric machinery, 
there is an interesting evidence on the complementarities between the two blocs. 
Of course, the Community becomes a main supplier of energy products to 
Mercosul, negative though very small decreases taking place in all other regions. 
The same applies, now again somewhat unexpectedly, with vegetables and fruits. 
Apart  from  this,  the  FTA  does  not  impact  much  the  other  regions’  exports. 
Finally, the effects on the US and the EU25 are strikingly similar, as synthesised 
by the two correlation coefficients. 
 
 
Table 5: Mercosul’s FTA with the Andean Community: Total trade flows 
changes (long run results; exports and imports), by the four main regions, under 
scenario D. 
5A. Exports. 
SECTORS  US  Mexico  Andean Com.  EU25 
Grains  -6.24  -3.39  93.95  -7.75 
Vegetables & fruits  0.61  0.42  94.11  0.85 
Oil seeds & soybeans  -1.50  -1.31  55.83  -1.22 
Sugar  -0.94  -  216.24  -1.52 
Coffee, rice & others  -1.08  -1.09  112.01  -1.40 
Animal products  -1.40  -1.63  236.17  -3.09 
Bovine meat (ab)   -2.02  -1.25  134.36  -1.35 
Poultry meat (ab)  -1.92  0.00  109.05  -1.86 
Dairy products (ab)  -1.06  -1.18  208.28  -2.84 
Bev. & tobacco (ab)  -1.13  -0.89  110.64  -1.12 
Vegetable oils (ab)  -2.21  -1.42  77.28  -1.43 
Minerals  -0.49  -0.27  100.47  -0.89 
Energy products  -0.04  -0.08  62.59  -0.25 
Text. & apparel  -1.20  -0.80  121.99  -2.74 
                                                                                                                                                                          
10 This pattern also repeats itself in the other (five) regions not shown. Leather, wood, paper  -1.24  -1.01  44.83  -2.29 
Other light manufac.  -0.10  -0.38  105.26  -1.78 
Chemicals & plastics  -1.75  -0.93  39.23  -1.72 
Ferrous metals  -1.56  -1.18  40.80  -3.47 
Non-ferrous metals  -0.99  -0.65  46.76  -2.26 
Motor vehicles  -0.37  -1.09  92.93  -0.89 
Other transp. equip.  -1.31  -1.48  135.58  -1.54 
Electric equipment  -1.03  -0.88  29.51  -2.03 
Machinery  -0.92  -1.43  72.64  -2.74 
(Services)  -1.23  -1.10  -2.89  -1.09 
TOTAL  -1.11  -1.08  76.93  -1.93 
Correlation between the US and EU25 patterns (Exports),  0.84 . 
 
5B. Imports. 
SECTORS  US  Mexico  Andean Com.  EU25 
Grains  10.48  -  136.54  9.46 
Vegetables & fruits  -2.37  -2.38  83.05  -2.43 
Oil seeds & soybeans  3.37  3.61  170.06  2.58 
Sugar  -  -  -  - 
Coffee, rice & others  1.66  1.56  114.01  1.49 
Animal products  2.98  3.01  146.95  2.88 
Bovine meat (ab)   1.83  0.00  0.00  1.80 
Poultry meat (ab)  1.97  0.00  70.22  1.95 
Dairy products (ab)  3.65  3.59  0.00  3.58 
Bev. & tobacco (ab)  1.52  1.53  182.32  1.48 
Vegetable oils (ab)  3.30  3.38  204.06  2.87 
Minerals  0.21  0.23  87.28  0.17 
Energy products  -0.46  -  21.15  -0.55 
Text. & apparel  173  1.74  180.89  1.70 
Leather, wood, paper  0.70  0.71  52.07  0.69 
Other light manufac.  1.92  1.94  299.15  1.89 Chemicals & plastics  0.75  0.76  41.77  0.73 
Ferrous metals  1.45  1.48  69.24  1.43 
Non-ferrous metals  0.61  0.62  65.25  0.60 
Motor vehicles  0.31  0.34  304.48  0.29 
Other transp. equip.  2.87  2.90  0.00  2.82 
Electric equipment  0.66  0.66  34.76  0.66 
Machinery  1.48  1.49  109.73  1.45 
(Services)  1.38  1.39  2.87  1.36 
TOTAL  1.22  0.92  52.39  1.16 
Correlation between the US and EU25 patterns (Imports), 1.00 . 
 
 
The FTAA, Scenario E, provides the integrated picture for scenarios A, C 
and D, the US presence being responsible for a few non-linearities. Table 6 gives 
a detailed picture of the total flows changes, for Mercosul. The two last rows 
show  the  difference  between  these  figures  and  the  corresponding  ones  for 
Scenario A, shown in Table 1; they reveal that the effects of Scenario A are 
thoroughly enhanced.  
Exports  increases  are  usually  superior  in  the  full  FTAA  case,  while 
imports ones always. For exports, dairy products, motor vehicles, beverages & 
tobacco,  and  textiles  &  apparel,  in  this  order,  present  the  greatest  changes  - 
sectors where Mercosul, but perhaps for motor vehicles, clearly has an advantage 
vis à vis more competitive blocs/economies. Notwithstanding, increases are also 
positive in all remaining trade-in-goods sectors. 
The  pattern  is  somehow  reverted  in  the  imports  flows,  which  increase 
substantially in the agricultural group. However here percentage values can be 
misleading. A 117.80 per cent rise in grains amounts to 39.3 m US$, while one of 
15.45 per cent in machinery to 2.7 bn US$ !   
 Tables 7 and 9 have formats similar, respectively, to Tables 2 and 5, and 
allow  for  a  closer  examination  of  impacts.  As  expected,  the  FTAA  induces 
Mercosul ‘coming closer’ to its Western Hemisphere (WH) partners. Though the impact  outside  the  hemisphere  is  somewhat  negligible  in  the  case  of  exports 
(Japan even showing no decrease), for imports the changes are both uniform and 
remarkable (notwithstanding increases in groups I and II). Table 8 adds a further 
insight  on  this,  by  comparing  the  total  flow  changes  for  the  four  scenarios 
dealing with WH integrations. From it, we see that the FTAA is as distorting – 
with  respect  to  regions  outside  the  agreement  –  as  the  Mercosul-US  FTA, 
though,  in  the  latter,  Mercosul  still  increases  its  exports  to  all  other  regions. 
Overall, the FTAA is roughly as beneficial to Mexico and the AC – in terms of 
their trade relations with Mercosul – as the individual scenarios C and D. It is 
undoubtedly a competitive choice within the realm of these four agreements.  
 
 
Table 6: The FTAA: Total trade flows changes (long run results; exports and 
imports) under scenario E, and differences E - A. 
Scenario E  Scenario E – Scenario A  Sectors 
Exports  Imports  Exports  Imports 
Grains  3.27  117.80  2.18  51.06 
Vegetables & fruits  9.49  60.05  6.29  54.36 
Oil seeds & soybeans  0.23  87.97  -0.16  53.94 
Sugar  7.44  -  1.43  - 
Coffee, rice & others  9.44  55.67  1.49  20.15 
Animal products  20.62  81.32  12.81  47.75 
Bovine meat (ab)   14.12  51.78  10.36  17.36 
Poultry meat (ab)  10.37  23.53  6.01  16.83 
Dairy products (ab)  132.73  57.09  119.71  24.44 
Bev. & tobacco (ab)  45.45  37.90  19.74  27.23 
Vegetable oils (ab)  2.22  23.48  1.52  9.86 
Minerals  10.56  40.72  4.67  27.85 
Energy products  12.70  8.01  10.66  7.21 
Text. & apparel  44.86  27.59  19.77  13.15 Leather, wood, paper  25.50  24.80  4.63  12.80 
Other light manufac.  20.50  56.40  14.29  14.38 
Chemicals & plastics  27.65  11.67  12.57  3.78 
Ferrous metals  17.76  13.69  4.24  6.06 
Non-ferrous metals  16.84  22.41  4.01  13.03 
Motor vehicles  51.98  37.03  32.87  14.76 
Other transp. equip.  25.59  50.51  -0.46  9.19 
Electric equipment  28.02  7.60  7.29  1.99 
Machinery  33.30  15.45  16.95  3.84 
(Services)  -1.21  1.50  -2.18  2.60 




Table 7: The FTAA (Scenario E): Trade flows changes (long run results) by 
Regions and Groups of Sectors. 
7A. Exports. 
Sector Groups  Total  Regions 
I  II  III  IV  V   
US  52.85  56.67  20.43  49.01  30.59  36.75 
Mexico  118.19  200.92  112.50  163.88  116.40  124.65 
Andean  106.44  89.79  94.40  75.29  43.01  61.54 
RoWH  51.67  81.03  17.06  44.82  42.88  38.03 
EU25  -4.01  -1.26  1.76  -2.82  5.18  -0.53 
Japan  -3.67  -0.42  2.56  -2.88  4.49  0.34 
China   -3.44  -2.17  2.60  -2.67  5.78  -0.66 
Asia10  -2.97  -1.38  2.38  -3.11  2.22  -0.88 
RoW  -3.60  -1.08  1.38  -2.51  5.28  -0.67 
 
7B. Imports. 
Regions  Sector Groups  Total   I  II  III  IV  V   
US  184.93  206.15  55.50  144.49  65.35  70.43 
Mexico  210.90  231.57  115.74  202.07  105.18  113.18 
Andean  136.61  223.08  28.47  131.36  56.91  55.59 
RoWH  117.96  139.40  69.30  70.62  57.65  70.23 
EU25  3.46  1.29  -3.60  -1.26  -11.69  -10.33 
Japan  6.88  0.47  -2.44  -3.79  -12.07  -11.66 
China   1.66  0.53  -0.23  3.68  10.16  -7.79 
Asia10  5.47  2.72  -2.64  -2.35  -8.77  -7.43 
RoW  4.01  2.29  0.69  -2.02  -8.75  -5.02 
Key to the groups [(number of sectors)]: I – agriculture (6), II – agribusiness (5), III – 
energy (2), IV – light manufactures (3), V – heavy manufactures (7). 
  
 
Table 8: Total trade flows changes (long run results), by Regions, for the four 
Western Hemisphere scenarios. 
EXPORTS  IMPORTS 
Scenarios  Scenarios 
REGIONS 
A  C  D  E  A  C  D  E 
US  39.70  -1.06  -1.10  36.75  69.26  0.54  1.19  70.43 
Mexico  5.55  119.58  -1.08  124.65  -8.42  138.96  0.83  113.18 
Andean  3.46  -0.81  78.64  61.54  -3.16  0.66  55.33  55.59 
RoWH  2.48  -0.72  -0.92  38.03  -5.69  0.65  0.87  70.23 
EU25  2.12  -1.24  -1.77  -0.53  -10.76  0.19  1.07  -10.33 
Japan  2.69  -1.67  -2.21  0.34  -11.70  -0.12  0.97  -11.66 
China   2.09  -1.26  -1.93  -0.66  -8.77  0.57  1.07  -7.79 
Asia10  2.27  -1.52  -2.32  -0.88  -8.08  0.26  1.00  -7.43 
RoW  2.16  -1.09  -1.97  -0.67  -6.16  0.42  0.60  -5.02 
 
 
  The  additional  insight  provided  by  Table  9  refers  to  the  market  losses 
caused  by  the  FTAA.  Taking,  for  instance,  Mercosur’s  exports  to  the  AC, comparison with Table 5 shows they usually lose market share, especially in the 
case of the nine manufactures, either light or heavy, sectors; indeed, with the 
exceptions of textiles & apparel (actually an increase) and non-ferrous metals 
(nearly  constant),  the  losses  are  significant.  Similarly,  for  EU25  imports,  the 
table shows a uniformly greater market loss in all manufactures sectors, with the 
exception of ferrous metals.  
 
 
Table 9: The FTAA: Total trade flows changes (long run results; exports and 
imports), by the four main regions, under scenario E. 
9A. Exports. 
SECTORS  US  Mexico  Andean Com.  EU25 
Grains  38,76  401,71  16,11  -5,20 
Vegetables & fruits  27,21  128,89  95,39  1,62 
Oil seeds & soybeans  187,37  37,25  41,94  -2,15 
Sugar  101,94  -  220,63  -4,09 
Coffee, rice & others  74,15  115,61  131,48  -9,39 
Animal products  37,43  171,34  218,03  -4,35 
Bovine meat (ab)   75,85  461,25  130,09  -0,39 
Poultry meat (ab)  29,73  0,00  103,83  0,09 
Dairy products (ab)  89,98  186,29  202,35  -5,56 
Bev. & tobacco (ab)  114,22  277,37  112,92  -1,06 
Vegetable oils (ab)  45,76  167,57  61,66  -1,71 
Minerals  36,64  114,03  102,58  2,34 
Energy products  6,32  32,18  82,68  -3,03 
Text. & apparel  78,19  95,98  120,70  0,80 
Leather, wood, paper  47,37  185,85  40,55  -3,47 
Other light manufac.  5,71  97,69  85,22  5,27 
Chemicals & plastics  41,66  99,62  34,22  4,81 
Ferrous metals  28,14  103,33  35,89  -2,96 Non-ferrous metals  23,26  114,72  45,06  5,11 
Motor vehicles  45,49  102,22  66,02  6,81 
Other transp. equip.  32,40  361,28  98,09  2,30 
Electric equipment  24,25  158,49  15,53  6,82 
Machinery  18,08  169,35  37,84  13,05 
(Services)  -0,89  -1,07  -5,28  -1,36 




SECTORS  US  Mexico  Andean Com.  EU25 
Grains  120,10    301,14  6,22 
Vegetables & fruits  118,52  134,33  81,99  -6,07 
Oil seeds & soybeans  137,37  162,12  224,22  4,23 
Sugar         
Coffee, rice & others  183,96  225,30  121,76  10,44 
Animal products  193,44  220,28  177,15  3,36 
Bovine meat (ab)   107,64  0,00  0,00  0,91 
Poultry meat (ab)  87,14  0,00  76,94  -1,22 
Dairy products (ab)  276,22  426,20  0,00  7,02 
Bev. & tobacco (ab)  195,97  220,68  197,72  0,14 
Vegetable oils (ab)  251,80  308,65  275,00  2,90 
Minerals  109,75  115,74  87,37  -4,55 
Energy products  28,69    20,45  0,94 
Text. & apparel  211,24  227,52  184,53  -2,13 
Leather, wood, paper  64,87  71,60  57,16  0,36 
Other light manufac.  368,88  422,67  331,51  -7,64 
Chemicals & plastics  40,51  43,48  38,08  -6,01 
Ferrous metals  85,01  96,95  74,40  0,74 
Non-ferrous metals  71,03  76,69  57,29  -6,08 
Motor vehicles  277,67  307,65  234,80  -15,15 Other transp. equip.  90,43  245,32  0,00  -20,18 
Electric equipment  26,56  26,97  31,10  -4,96 
Machinery  83,12  91,66  105,97  -16,67 
(Services)  1,15  1,47  5,12  1,61 
TOTAL  57,86  96,54  52,76  -6,70 
 
 
The flows analysis is completed by looking at the Mercosul-China FTA. 
Table 10 displays the regional changes it induces, by sector groups, while Table 
11 gives a more detailed information on the total and Chinese flows.     
Comparing  Table  10  with  Table  3,  we  see  that,  qualitatively,  the 
Mercosul-China  FTA  induces  a  pattern  similar  to  the  one  generated  by  the 
Mercosul-EU25  FTA.  The  difference,  in  exports,  lies  in  group  V,  where 
Mercosul exports now suffer a deviation in Asian and RoW regions, being not 
affected in the remaining of the globe. In the case of imports, all regions, as 




Table 10: The Mercosul-China FTA (Scenario F): Trade flows changes (long run 
results) by Regions and Groups of Sectors. 
10A. Exports. 
Sector Groups  Total  Regions 
I  II  III  IV  V   
US  -1.43  -1.06  -0.19  -0.83  0.93  0.18 
Mexico  -1.49  -0.54  -0.10  -0.53  1.57  1.06 
Andean  -1.09  -0.60  -0.54  -0.01  0.40  0.02 
RoWH  -1.21  -0.72  -0.26  -0.56  0.22  -0.27 
EU25  -1.75  -0.66  -0.81  -1.64  0.20  -0.94 
Japan  -2.07  -1.23  -0.80  -1.50  -1.48  -1.45 China   31.20  117.26  10.29  311.57  490.03  141.13 
Asia10  -1.54  -0.85  -0.75  -1.90  -1.30  -1.29 
RoW  -1.71  -0.73  -0.97  -1.49  -0.05  -1.02 
 
10B. Imports. 
Sector Groups  Total  Regions 
I  II  III  IV  V   
US  2.32  1.35  0.44  -2.75  -0.86  -0.84 
Mexico  1.81  1.45  -0.05  -2.75  -1.41  -1.34 
Andean  1.31  1.15  0.63  -2.03  -0.15  -0.37 
RoWH  1.29  1.48  0.22  -0.44  -0.49  -0.14 
EU25  2.28  1.39  0.20  -2.29  -1.51  -1.40 
Japan  3.95  1.43  0.06  -7.40  -1.97  -2.01 
China   196.71  339.17  35.77  286.55  103.92  142.74 
Asia10  3.35  0.99  0.05  -3.21  -1.18  -1.40 
RoW  2.66  1.47  0.73  -2.50  -0.76  -0.27 
Key to the groups [(number of sectors)]: I – agriculture (6), II – agribusiness (5), III – 
energy (2), IV – light manufactures (3), V – heavy manufactures (7). 
 
  Table 11 shows that, in general, though the figures for the China flows are 
usually high to very high, the impact in the total flows is small. Even so, it is 
funny  to  see  that  many  indications  of  contraction  appear  for  total  exports. 
Definitely, China is an interesting partner whose role will evolve.  
 
 
Table 11: The Mercosul-China FTA: Total and Chinese trade flows changes 
(long run results; exports and imports) under scenario F. 
Total flows  Mercosul-China flows  Sectors 
Exports  Imports  Exports  Imports 
Grains 
-0,46  0,63 
10,46  - 
Vegetables & fruits 
-0,01  5,56 
-  154,81 Oil seeds & soybeans 
-0,05  1,73 
0,40  88,76 
Sugar 
3,23  8,80 
427,89  - 
Coffee, rice & others 
3,61  6,09 
264,23  140,81 
Animal products 
2,29  0,63 
308,42  229,70 
Bovine meat (ab)  
-0,67  1,39 
514,65  0,00 
Poultry meat (ab) 
-0,94  1,41 
122,58  0,00 
Dairy products (ab) 
-0,82  1,61 
0,00  0,00 
Bev. & tobacco (ab) 
-0,84  1,58 
192,63  339,17 
Vegetable oils (ab) 
-0,18  0,91 
95,92  0,00 
Minerals 
0,72  5,73 
9,99  130,07 
Energy products 
-0,26  1,08 
17,68  7,91 
Text. & apparel 
83,24  42,45 
863,32  281,98 
Leather, wood, paper 
4,73  5,80 
129,30  72,66 
Other light manufac. 
9,92  148,71 
970,99  419,25 
Chemicals & plastics 
2,20  2,00 
158,52  52,93 
Ferrous metals 
1,10  3,94 
87,85  100,15 
Non-ferrous metals 
0,28  4,54 
165,61  95,67 
Motor vehicles 
43,81  -3,47 
1.551,86  462,18 
Other transp. equip. 
3,05  12,58 
110,77  411,27 
Electric equipment 
3,27  1,62 
233,41  35,33 
Machinery 
6,19  4,50 
218,07  156,30 




-1,64  1,62 




133,09  131,12 
Correlation between the two patterns: i) Exports,  0.62 (without motor vehicles),  0.69 
(with motor vehicles); ii) Imports, 0.46 . 
 
 
Changes in trade flows have no clear, unidirectional relation with what 
happens to output and, most importantly, welfare – the ultimate goal of any CGE 
evaluation. Synthetic information on all the scenarios is obtained from Tables 12 
to  14,  showing,  respectively,  the  changes  in  labour,  output  and  welfare. Reminding that labour is reallocated in each scenario, keeping its total constant, 
the two first tables show that, in general, changes induced by the six scenarios 
are not very drastic. As expected, the directions of change are the same, in both 
tables. 
The Mercosul-EU25 agreement induces a more worrying contraction on 
the heavy manufacturing sectors motor vehicles, other transport equipment and 
machinery,  what,  for  the  two  last  ones,  also  happens  with  the  US  or  FTAA 
agreements, though with less intensity. This might be due to the impact of the 
major unleashing of agribusiness exports to the EU, what might be distorting 
somewhat the results. Moreover, given the more traditional sides of the European 
economy, maybe there is less scope for Mercosul manufactures in that market.  
The FTAA reduces output in the other light manufactures, chemicals & 
plastics, non-ferrous metals and, especially, in other transport equipment and 
machinery sectors. The most notable increase takes place in motor vehicles. Part 
of these results goes against those obtained in Flôres (2003) for Brazil, where the 
FTAA slightly decreased ‘cars’ output (-0.4), while increasing ‘other vehicles’ 
(+2.1). Beyond the aggregation level (Brazil x Mercosul), the different base years 
(1997, in Flôres (2003)) must be at play here. 
 
 
Table 12: Total labour changes (long run results; percentage from base values), 




Labour*  A  B  C  D  E  F 
Wheat, Corn and Other Grains  1.045,0  0,26  4,41  0,01  0,88  0,66  -0,22 
Vegetables and Fruits  745,0  0,54  3,08  -0,12  -0,52  -0,81  -0,28 
Oil seeds and Soybeans  1.350,0  0,52  2,08  -0,15  0,09  0,47  -0,20 
Sugar  695,1  3,33  3,66  -0,40  -0,32  3,97  1,51 
Coffee, Rice and Other Crops  1.228,2  1,13  5,51  0,03  -0,04  1,02  0,49 
Animal Products  5.788,4  0,19  4,51  -0,03  0,21  0,44  0,05 
Bovine Meat  425,0  0,71  24,87  0,09  -0,13  1,83  -0,02 
Poultry Meat   141,8  2,02  28,16  -0,40  -0,92  4,23  -0,48 Dairy Products  509,6  0,45  -0,86  2,68  1,40  4,52  0,05 
Beverages and Tobaccos  506,0  0,43  -4,39  0,13  0,05  0,13  -0,04 
Vegetable Oils  323,1  0,69  24,14  -0,59  1,26  1,87  -0,35 
Minerals  1.131,0  0,39  0,77  -0,09  -0,21  -0,22  -0,18 
Energy Products  366,0  0,56  0,10  -0,36  -1,03  1,05  -0,46 
Textiles and Apparel  965,0  1,16  0,04  -0,26  0,75  1,51  2,78 
Leather, Wood and Paper  2.321,4  5,70  4,96  0,66  -0,35  5,95  0,82 
Other Light Manufactures  791,0  -3,21  -4,82  -0,06  0,12  -3,50  -11,84 
Chemical and Plastic Products  1.885,0  -2,46  -4,22  -0,20  0,31  -2,33  -0,21 
Ferrous metals  387,0  4,74  -1,44  1,03  0,49  6,44  1,28 
Non-ferrous Metals  1.057,5  -1,40  -3,19  0,19  -0,39  -2,56  -0,06 
Motor Vehicles  625,8  1,62  -15,06  2,50  2,81  8,11  13,09 
Other Transport Equipment  645,8  -3,89  -13,83  0,01  0,20  -4,27  2,70 
Electric Equipment  304,4  2,96  1,63  1,58  0,39  5,15  0,43 
Machinery  1.354,1  -8,76  -10,12  0,78  1,17  -6,99  -1,79 
Utilities and Construction  4.773,7  -2,75  -0,81  0,45  0,80  -1,64  0,48 
Trade and Services  61.106,0  0,16  -0,43  -0,12  -0,16  -0,10  -0,10 
Total  90.470,9  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00 
* in 1.000 workers 
 
 
Table 13: Total output changes (long run results; percentage from base values), 




Values*  A  B  C  D  E  F 
Grains  7,9  0,11  2,50  0,01  0,57  0,34  -0,13 
Vegetables and Fruits  5,3  0,28  1,65  -0,08  -0,31  -0,60  -0,17 
Oilseeds & Soybeans  12,5  0,24  0,90  -0,08  0,06  0,18  -0,10 
Sugar  9,6  1,54  1,28  -0,20  -0,13  1,79  0,78 
Coffee, Rice & Others  12,4  0,47  2,19  0,02  -0,01  0,40  0,23 
Animal Products  63,6  0,08  2,12  -0,01  0,11  0,20  0,03 
Bovine Meat  16,8  0,61  20,63  0,08  -0,11  1,54  -0,01 
Poultry Meat   7,0  1,67  23,06  -0,32  -0,77  3,48  -0,39 
Dairy Products  16,3  0,10  -0,88  1,28  0,70  1,97  0,04 
Bever. and Tobaccos  13,0  0,37  -4,28  0,11  0,04  0,04  -0,04 Vegetable Oils  15,1  0,26  8,56  -0,22  0,47  0,70  -0,13 
Minerals  25,8  0,21  0,39  -0,05  -0,12  -0,15  -0,10 
Energy Products  35,5  -0,03  -1,60  -0,22  -0,55  0,07  -0,23 
Textiles & Apparel  26,2  0,64  0,02  -0,14  0,41  0,82  1,52 
Leather, Wood, Paper  45,2  3,81  3,31  0,44  -0,24  3,97  0,55 
Other Light Manufac.  15,8  -1,80  -2,71  -0,03  0,07  -1,96  -6,74 
Chemical & Plastics  60,0  -1,14  -1,96  -0,09  0,14  -1,08  -0,10 
Ferrous metals  20,8  2,32  -0,71  0,51  0,24  3,15  0,63 
Non-ferrous Metals  27,0  -0,92  -2,11  0,12  -0,25  -1,68  -0,04 
Motor Vehicles  23,6  0,60  -16,34  1,59  2,37  5,62  11,14 
Other Transp. Equip.  15,7  -4,37  -13,81  0,01  0,19  -4,77  2,58 
Electric Equipment  13,6  1,08  0,60  0,58  0,14  1,87  0,16 
Machinery  31,0  -4,56  -5,28  0,40  0,60  -3,63  -0,92 
Utilities & Construction  124,2  -0,85  -0,25  0,14  0,24  -0,51  0,15 
Trade and Services  641,9  0,10  -0,27  -0,07  -0,10  -0,06  -0,06 
Total  1286,0  -0,03  -0,21  0,15  0,15  0,09  0,17 
* in bn US$ 
 
  Judging from a single figure of merit, Table 14 easily ranks the options. 
Irrespectively whether GDP or EV is used, the competing pairs of scenarios are 
B versus E and A versus F. The latter means that China, if on one hand inducing, 
via its FTA with Mercosul, a trade flows pattern similar to that created by the 
EU25-Mercosul FTA, on the other hand, in welfare gains, is already competing 
with a US-Mercosul FTA. 
Welfare  results  –  both  in  plain  real  GDP  variation,  or  in  the  more 
sophisticated equivalent variation (EV) computation – are however surprisingly 
low, for a model including imperfect competition. The explanation probably lies 
on the fact that most gains, in all agreements, derive from the perfect competition 
sectors, those in strategic interaction many times suffering a contraction. This is 
linked to an important policy issue to be developed in the next section.  
 
 Table 14: A few figures of merit: Total variations (long run results; percentage 




Values  A  B  C  D  E  F 
Real GDP    438,1  0,189  0,788  0,163  0,164  0,647  0.298 
Welfare (EV)  75,7  0,377  0,482  0,082  0,056  0,630  0.257 
Exports *  72,8  11,09  23,52  3,09  2,82  19,41  6,18 
Imports *  68,5  12,31  23,40  2,77  2,34  19,86  5,93 
* only merchandise trade 
 
 
5.  Mercosul: opportunities and defficiencies.  
 
The fact of simultaneously analysing several integration possibilities provides 
additional  insights  on  the  performance  of  the  “invariant”  partner,  namely 
Mercosul. In particular, questions of efficiency and adjustment may be identified 
in a more consistent way. 
  It is tempting to divide the respective results in Tables 13 and 12, in order 
to  evaluate  the  variations  in  gross  labour  productivity,  by  sector,  for  each 
agreement;  this  however  is  not  very  informative  in  the  present  exercise.  The 
constant total labour closure enhances the absolute value of the changes in this 
factor, which, as mentioned above, have the same directions as those for output. 
This implies that, uniformly, productivity decreases for a sector where output 
expands, and increases for those that suffer a contraction. Though this can make 
sense, the fact that it is a consequence of the mechanics of the model makes the 
productivity analysis less realistic. 
  The issue of adjustment, called upon in a CGE context by Giordano and 
Watanuki (2001) and Flôres (2003), remains a major one, especially for a bloc 
with  mixed  characteristics  like  Mercosul.  Based  on  Table  12,  we  derived  a 
classification of winning (W), neutral (N), conflicting (C) and losing (L) sectors. 
Neglecting variations less than 1 per cent in absolute value, a sector is defined as 
winnng, if all other output variations are positive; neutral, if no variations outside the 1 per cent range take place; 
conflicting, if positive and negative variations appear outside the range; 
losing, if all other output variations are negative. 
  Table 15 shows the result of directly applying the above criteria to data in 
Table 12. The outcome is informative.  
In the worldly competitive groups of Agriculture and Agribusiness, one 
loser appears, beverages & tobacco, due to its contraction in the EU25 FTA. It is 
worth  pointing  out  that  orange  juice,  a  very  performing  Brazilian  export  is 
subsumed in this sector. Also, oilseeds and soybeans turns out as a neutral sector. 
  In the Light Manufactures group the situation is not very encouraging, but 
for leather, wood, paper where a basket of goods from Argentina, Brazil and 
Uruguay  have  established  market  niches,  with  growth  potential.  Textiles  & 
apparel manages to be a winner, thanks to China, but other light manufactures is 
a total loser. Things get worse in Heavy Manufactures. Three losers – including 
the non-ferrous metals industry, what is both surprising and worrying – and two 
conflicting cases are found. Out of the latter, the first is more of a winner, but for 
the strong contraction in the EU25 scenario, and the second more of a loser, if the 
increase  in  the  China  FTA  didn’t  take  place.  It  is  worth  reminding  that  the 
competitive Brazilian middle-sized aircraft are included in this last sector. 
  Finally, the pattern in the Energy group is faithful to Mercosul’s relatively 
neutral standing in the two aggregate sectors.  
  It is also important to highlight that, out of the 13 winning sectors, 5 own 
their  classification  to  only  one  FTA  result:  all  are  in  the  Agriculture  and 
Agribusiness groups, and the FTA is the one with the EU25 which, as mentioned 
in section 4, presents perhaps the more distorted – though not uninteresting - 
result, driven by the opening of the CAP-protected market. 
     
 
Table 15: A ‘Winners and Losers’pattern derived from the total output changes 
in Table 12. 
SECTORS  Winner  Scenarios   or Loser  A  B  C  D  E  F 
Grains  W  -  2,50  -  -  -  - 
Vegetables and Fruits  W  -  1,65  -  -  -  - 
Oilseeds & Soybeans  N  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Sugar  W  1,54  1,28  -  -  1,79  - 
Coffee, Rice & Others  W  -  2,19  -  -  -  - 
Animal Products  W  -  2,12  -  -  -  - 
Bovine Meat  W  -  20,63  -  -  1,54  - 
Poultry Meat   W  1,67  23,06  -  -  3,48  - 
Dairy Products  W  -  -  1,28  -  1,97  - 
Bever. And Tobaccos  L  -  -4,28  -  -  -  - 
Vegetable Oils  W  -  8,56  -  -  -  - 
Minerals  N  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Energy Products  L  -  -1,60  -  -  -  - 
Textiles & Apparel  W  -  -  -  -  -  1,52 
Leather, Wood, Paper  W  3,81  3,31  -  -  3,97  - 
Other Light Manufac.  L  -1,80  -2,71  -  -  -1,96  -6,74 
Chemical & Plastics  L  -1,14  -1,96  -  -  -1,08  - 
Ferrous metals  W  2,32  -  -  -  3,15  - 
Non-ferrous Metals  L  -  -2,11  -  -  -1,68  - 
Motor Vehicles  C  -  -16,34  1,59  2,37  5,62  11,14 
Other Transp. Equip.  C  -4,37  -13,81  -  -  -4,77  2,58 
Electric Equipment  W  1,08  -  -  -  1,87  - 
Machinery  L  -4,56  -5,28  -  -  -3,63  - 
 
 
  Summing up the previous analysis, a more nuanced interpretation of Table 
15 can be provided: 
Mercosul  is  clearly  competitive  in  the  following  sectors:  sugar;  bovine  and 
poultry  meat;  dairy  products;  leather,  wood,  paper;  ferrous  metals;  electric 
equipment and motor vehicles; the last one presenting problems in a EU25 FTA; 
Mercosul clearly has competitiveness problems in the following sectors: other 
light manufactures; chemicals  & plastics; non-ferrous metals; other transport 
equipment and machinery;  For the remaining 10 sectors the bloc is roughly neutral, presenting sometimes 
some competitiveness – 6 sectors – or more of a loser character – 2 sectors; only 
2 remaining sectors qualifying as “true neutrals”. 
  Despite the proviso that the aggregation level of the sectoral division blurs 
a mix of positive and negative situations – some exemplified above -, and the 
inevitably  arbitrary  character  of  our  “classification”,  the  final  synthesis  looks 
quite reasonable. It lays bare a key defficiency of the bloc, which, unfortunately, 
is  really  competitive  in  a  few  classical  manufactures  sectors  and  selected 
segments of the agribusiness (plus sugar), i.e., lower value-added activities. All 
non-competitive areas comprise key industrial sectors. 
  It is of course not necessarily bad for a bloc to have its trade assets in low 
value-added sectors. Creativity and upgrading are important tools for improving 
its  terms  of  trade,  as  the  Brazilian  ‘sandálias  havaianas’  and  the  Argentine 
‘dulce  de  leche’-based  goods  show  –  beyond  the  persistent  upgrading  that 
Mercosul meat exporters are accomplishing -, but clearly this is not enough. As 
shown by a simple, aggregate CGE exercise, the bloc must seriously consider an 
industrial adjustment process, to enhance its overall competitiveness and provide 
it a better insertion in the world value-added chains. Whether this will be pursued 
through a co-ordinated, internal political will, or forced, in a less planned (and 





Summing up the previous results, it seems that the imperfect competition sectors, 
by keeping the  segmented  markets strategy, were able – in all scenarios - to 
practice a kind of reciprocal dumping (à la Brander and Krugman (1983)), what 
partially “saved” them from more drastic outcomes. Indeed, compared with a 
carefully conducted study like Harrison et al. (2002), our corresponding results 
are much less dramatic as regards output changes, decreases in these quantities 
being relatively few or small, even in the full FTAA scenario. Imperfect competition accounts also for less volatile changes than in the 
pure perfect competition exercises – where though welfare doesn’t vary much, 
output,  imports  and  exports  vary  wildly  to  accommodate  the  changes  in  the 
equilibrium  price  vector.  Nevertheless,  welfare  changes  were  somewhat  low, 
signalling  perhaps  perfect  competition  effects  were  still  strong.  One  needed 
development then is the inclusion of more sectors under imperfect competition, 
those  in  the  heavy  manufactures  group  being  the  first  natural  candidates. 
Notwithstanding, given the aggregation level of the model, it will not be easy to 
portray  a  minimally  coherent  strategic  interaction  for  some  of  them,  like 
chemicals & plastics. 
We point out again that the study focussed mainly on market access for 
goods.  The  dynamics  of  other  crucial  concessions  –  regarding,  for  instance, 
foreign  direct  investment  –  may  greatly  affect  the  results  here  discussed. 
Moreover, better treatment of the services sector seems mandatory.  
Another key issue is rules of origin (RoO). Brenton and Manchin (2002) 
call  attention  to  the  fact  that,  in  1999,  two-thirds  of  the  products  eligible  to 
preferences of different forms, which entered the EU from developing countries, 
did so under the most-favoured-nation (MFN) tariff, thanks to the appallingly 
cumbersome and costly  red tape needed to prove that one complied with the 
specific  RoO.  Since  at  least  Hoekman  (1993)  and  Garay  and  Estevadeordal 
(1996), specialists have been emphasizing the role played by RoO in concessions 
and preferential agreements, like the Generalised System of Preferences or the 
North  America  Free  Trade  Agreement  (NAFTA).  Nevertheless,  adequate 
treatment  of  RoO  in  the  CGE  framework  is  only  beginning,  and  in  fairly 
debatable ways. The IDB has been making efforts to develop a system that may 
allow an easier and more systematic way of treating these questions, something 
to be incorporated in later versions of the model
11.  
                                                            
11 See, for approaches within the CGE context, Bouët et al. (2003) and Gasiorek et al. (2001), 
and Garay and Cornejo (2002), as one of the documents related to the IDB efforts. It is also worth pointing out that an indirect sensitivity analysis has been 
performed, when contrasting the six sets of FTA results, but this doesn’t exclude 
the need for further investigations in this line. 
In qualitative terms, a main message stands out: being a less competitive 
economy, Mercosul, while facing FTA’s with the US or the EU, will be able to 
reap profits (or welfare gains) in its performing traditional sectors, where, to its 
competitive  advantages,  one  must  add  the  richness  of  related  natural 
endowments.  In  the  more  modern  sectors  the  situation  is  not  very  clear.  In 
general, there will be a domestic contraction, imports will raise and, rather than 
from a competitiveness effect – which would set the sector in better shape for 
surviving in the world arena – welfare gains in imperfect competition are mostly 
due to the sheer reduction in tariffs. This pattern is reasonably serious in the 
FTAA and in scenario A, but also arises – in a more distorted way - when the US 
is discarded for the EU25.  
The broad finding above raises a flag for the timing of tariff liberalisations 
or, thinking on the negotiation strategies, for perhaps a Grossman and Helpman 
(1995) approach of mere sector exclusions in some of the FTAs examined, be it 
either to appease legitimate internal (sector) fears or to control the development 
of possibly competitive ones. 
Agriculture, which fits into the basic message just highlighted, shows the 
usually promising figures, both for commodities and the agribusiness, being of 
interest now to allocate the results among the four members. It is also important 
because, in our optimistic versions of FTAs, subsidies were disregarded. Given 
that  most production  subsidies lie in the CAP, this signals that the EU is an 
extremely  competitive  partner,  vis  à  vis  the  US,  for  a  FTA  with  Mercosul, 
provided some move in agriculture, beyond tariffs, is made. 
From  a  regional  viewpoint,  the  results  showed  that  South-South 
agreements,  like  the  one  with  the  AC,  can  turn  out  better  than  expected. 
Moreover, the signs of China getting closer to the US and the EU25 - in terms of 
“after FTA” effects – only add to the certainty of its importance in the very near 
future.  Finally,  it  is  worth  reminding  the  WTO  dimension,  due  to  its 
interrelationships with the final objectives of this study. Indeed, it is somehow 
ironic that in sectors where the bloc will undoubtedly reap gains in almost any 
FTA  scenario,  like  leather,  wood,  paper  or  textiles  &  apparel,  and  even 
agriculture in general, multilateral liberalisation will have an impact on these 
very  gains,  by  enhancing  the  market  access  of  other  competitors,  not  only 
underdeveloped ones, but the likes of India, China or other Asiatic countries, not 
forgetting the US. It is perhaps not too radical to bring back the importance and 
precedence of multilateral negotiations. Also, given the encompassing character 
of the FTA proposals here evaluated, in areas like services, where Mercosul in 
principle lags behind, the multilateral forum seems a better locus for exchanges.  
It is undoubtedly important to clinch FTAs, however, negotiations must 
not be conducted with a short-term perspective; nowadays appealing gains may 
become  vapid  conquests  even  before  full  implementation  of  the  agreement. 
Market access concessions and demands must be designed keeping in mind the 
bloc’s global competitiveness and potentialities, as well as the possible outcomes 
of the different negotiations. Moreover, it is high time for Mercosul to decide 
whether it will, moved primarily by its internal forces, streamline and upgrade its 
exports profile, or will let it at the mercy of distinct integration shocks, many not 
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